Book Review: Tempered Zeal: A Columbia Law Professor\u27s Year on the Streets with the New York City Police. by H. Richard Uviller. by Dolinko, David
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Constitutional Commentary
1991
Book Review: Tempered Zeal: A Columbia Law
Professor's Year on the Streets with the New York
City Police. by H. Richard Uviller.
David Dolinko
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Constitutional
Commentary collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Dolinko, David, "Book Review: Tempered Zeal: A Columbia Law Professor's Year on the Streets with the New York City Police. by H.
Richard Uviller." (1991). Constitutional Commentary. 245.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm/245
560 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 8:551 
expression, control that would not be permitted if the expression 
were that of a private citizen. Such control is a condition of 
service.I3 
Again, this is not to suggest that the government can control 
military speech completely. At some point the connection between 
the military endeavor on the one hand and a soldier's expression on 
the other becomes too attenuated. Where that point lies seems a 
question best answered initially by the military, subject ultimately 
to court review. Military leaders like to get the job done, and the 
value of communication is forced upon those who don't already ap-
preciate it. Military leaders also know a lot about the nature of 
discipline; martinets shouting orders went out of style long ago. 
Doubtless the interest in free expression by soldiers is not weighed 
as accurately by the military as it is by the courts, but it is just as 
likely that a court will not weigh the military's interest in discipline 
as accurately as the military will. It therefore makes sense for the 
courts generally to defer to the military in evaluating that interest. 
Certainly an across-the-board increase in the amount of court intru-
sion into the military communication structure requires far more 
justification than Packer has presented. 
TEMPERED ZEAL: A COLUMBIA LAW PROFES-
SOR'S YEAR ON THE STREETS WITH THE NEW 
YORK CITY POLICE. By H. Richard Uviller.1 Chicago: 
Contemporary Books. 1988. Pp. xix, 234. Cloth, $19.95. 
David Dolinko 2 
Appellate judges and legal academics too often lack firsthand 
acquaintance with the front-line realities of the criminal justice sys-
tem. Fearing that his own exposure to those realities as a young 
prosecutor had grown stale during fourteen years teaching law, Pro-
fessor H. Richard Uviller spent eight months of a recent sabbatical 
"hanging out with" and observing police in the crime-ridden Ninth 
Precinct of New York City. The book that resulted should interest 
13. While service is not always voluntary, everyone recognizes that military service in-
volves at least the kinds of loss of freedom that are incident to voluntary employment. If a 
drafted soldier has the freedom to ftout orders, then it doesn't make much sense to have a 
draft at all. Maybe the draft is unwise or unconstitutional, but surely such a conclusion is not 
required simply by the freedom of expression principles of the first amendment. 
I. Professor of Law, Columbia University. 
2. Professor of Law, University of California at Los Angeles. 
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anyone concerned with the mind-set and working environment of 
the police and their responses to the constitutional criminal proce-
dure jurisprudence of the past few decades. 
This is not to deny the book's failings. It is not even remotely a 
sound piece of social scientific research-unsurprisingly, given Uvil-
ler's naively Baconian decision to "resis[t] all temptations to forum-
late a theory to guide my investigation." No reason is given to 
suppose that New York's police department is fairly representative 
of big-city American departments generally.3 Even within the New 
York department, the particular unit Uviller observed-a special 
robbery investigation team called "9 RIP"-is highly unusual, mix-
ing patrolmen and detectives in an uncommonly egalitarian fashion 
that made it an informal, unstructured "pocket of anarchy in the 
midst of a vast, paramilitary, bureaucratic structure." 
Nonetheless, the dearth of empirical information on the real-
world context and consequences of the Supreme Court's criminal 
procedure decisions should make us grateful for Uviller's anecdotes 
and observations. These come interspersed with mini-lectures on a 
variety of topics including the Miranda doctrine, the conduct of 
lineups, and how to get a search warrant, which will be of interest 
primarily to readers generally unfamiliar with the criminal law and 
its enforcement mechanisms. The anecdotes and observations offer 
a compelling though necessarily partial picture of the atmosphere 
and setting of police life and the ways in which police respond to 
the constraints of the Constitution as judicially interpreted. 
Physically, the officers Uviller studied moved through a 
cramped, no-frills, timeworn stationhouse in a generally down-at-
the-heels neighborhood with more than its share of homeless per-
sons, prostitutes, abandoned buildings and thriving drug traffickers. 
Emotionally, they inhabited a world of frustration arising from "the 
inescapable sense of helplessness at the heart of power, the madden-
ing inability to make the process work despite all the authority im-
plicit in the badge." Mistrust of outsiders is pervasive-as Sergeant 
Browne, 9 RIP's commander, laments, "no one ever gives us the 
whole truth. I usually end up not knowing what the hell really hap-
pened." Citizen complaints of brutality arouse resentment, and citi-
3. Previous observers have found wide disparities in the behavior of different depart-
ments. Charles Silberman, for example, spoke of "a world of difference between the cold, 
aloof, impersonal 'professional' style cultivated by Los Angeles police, ... and the warmer, 
more personal and civil ... orientation of police in cities such as Oakland and New York." 
Charles E. Silberman, Criminal Violence, Cn"minal Justice 289 (Vintage Books, 1978). James 
Q. Wilson's study of eight American police departments distinguished three styles of policing: 
"watchman," "legalistic," and "service." James Q. Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior 
(Harvard U. Press, 1970). 
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zens seeking police assistance are themselves often less than 
upstanding. The non-police components of the criminal justice sys-
tem are not much better. Judges, especially appellate judges, seem 
aloof, unsympathetic, even dense, and assistant DA's are often hec-
toring, dismissive, and-to the cops-cowardly. Even the police 
force itself can exasperate, with its stifling bureaucracy "that always 
seems more concerned with rules, statistics, and risk aversion than 
with good ideas and initiative" -prompting in one officer a "feeling 
that this department is run by morons." 
Much of this grim picture duplicates previous observers' find-
ings. Police skepticism and distrust of the public is frequently 
noted,4 and Jerome Skolnick reported in the mid-sixties that police 
thought judges unreasonable, unintelligent meddlers abdicating 
their crime-fighting responsibilities.s Skolnick, however, painted a 
much more harmonious picture of police-prosecutor relations, find-
ing low-level screening prosecutors deferential to police and high-
ranking prosecutors able to criticize them without arousing resent-
ment.6 It would be interesting to know whether the bad blood Uvil-
ler discovered stems from specific features of the Manhattan DA's 
office, and how common or idiosyncratic those features are. 
Uviller's view of the police officer's world is by no means 
wholly grim, however, and comes nowhere near Arthur Niederhof-
fer's bleak picture of rampant cynicism "at all levels, in every 
branch of law enforcement."? Uviller's officers find their work 
meaningful and strive to achieve justice. They approach even the 
most dangerous situations with "an air of casual confidence," taking 
charge with crisp authority and demanding respect and deference-
successfully, in most instances. These officers value their hunches 
and pride themselves on their ability to "sense" criminal activity, to 
the point of occasional overconfidence. These attitudes (essentially 
those Skolnick described as the police "craftsman" approach) help 
explain the cops' resentment when second-guessed by distant judges 
and their dismay at the loss of control and challenges to their views 
which they experience in the judicial arena. 
4. William Westley's 1951 doctoral thesis, published in 1970, harps on this theme. 
William A. Westley, Violence and the Police 106-08, 110-11, 145 (MIT Press, 1970). See also 
Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior at 21·29 (cited in role 3); Silberman, Criminal Violence, 
Criminal Justice at 325 (cited in note 3). 
5. Jerome H. Skolnick. Justice Without Tn'al 225-29 (John Wiley & Sons, 2d ed., 
1966). But one more recent study found police less cynical toward judges and courts than 
either firemen or college students. Phil J. Crawford and Thomas J. Crawford, Police Atti-
tudes Toward the Judicial System, II J. Police Sci. & Admin. 290, 293 (1983). 
6. Skolnick, Justice Without Trial at 199-202 (cited in note 5). 
7. Arthur Niederholfer, Behind the Shield: The Police in Urban Society 94 
(Doubleday, 1967). 
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Yet that arena, and particularly its remote appellate judges, 
sets the ground rules that constrain police discretion in detecting 
and investigating crime. How do the police respond? Uviller re-
ports that they generally follow the law, and fall back on a reliable 
intuitive sense of fairness in situations where the law gives them vast 
discretion. Thus the police "understand the basic principles of 
search and seizure law as expounded by the High Court" and "felt 
its constraint upon their actions." They have "internalized the ba-
sic ingredients of a fair lineup" and they "Mirandize" suspects 
before any formal interrogation-though not immediately upon 
arrest (which is not legally required). Though warrants give officers 
almost unlimited discretion to search disruptively and destructively, 
cops routinely obey self-imposed limits. Similar restraint controls 
their use of weapons and their interaction with citizens on the 
street-indeed, Uviller claims he "never saw an officer speak rudely 
to a civilian, much less push someone around."s And 9 RIP won't 
initiate robbery prosecutions without identification evidence supply-
ing far more than the bare "probable cause" required by law. 
Yet while the officers may know and grudgingly follow consti-
tutional rules, they seem largely oblivious to the point of those rules. 
Many seemed to think the Supreme Court's fourth amendment 
cases reflected only a desire to deter searches and seizures,9 while 
Miranda was "just another way for the courts to throw out per-
fectly good evidence."Jo They resented being expected to observe 
8. It's hard to take this assertion at face value. Perhaps what seemed polite and un-
threatening to Professor Uviller might appear rude to a citizen overawed by a "sudden, ag-
gressive move" from the police, with their "firm tone" and ''hand ... placed heavily and 
decisively." Perhaps the officers consciously or unconsciously modified their behavior in 
Uviller's presence-though Uviller believes otherwise. Certainly, well-publicized incidents 
such as the March 3, 1991 videotaped beating of an unarmed traffic arrestee by Los Angeles 
police make one wonder how representative Uviller's polite 9 RIP cops can be. It's worth 
noting that, as one review of Tempered Zeal pointed out, Uviller's Ninth Precinct itself is not 
immune to blatant brutality: Ninth Precinct cops responded to a riot in a neighborhood park 
in August 1988 by covering their badge numbers and beating civilians indiscriminately, and 
by subsequently refusing to testify before the department's internal review board. See Book 
Note, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1390, 1393 n.l3 (1990). 
9. The police whom Uviller observed spoke bitterly of the frustration of seeing plainly 
guilty criminals turned loose "because the judge didn't like the way the cop took the knife off 
him." It is not clear whether they knew, or would be comforted by knowing, that most 
statistical studies find the exclusionary rule's impact negligible. See Thomas Y. Davies, A 
Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn) About the "Costs" of the Exclusionary 
Rule: The NJJ Study and Other Studies of ''lAst" A"ests, 1983 Am. Bar Found. Res. J. 611. 
10. Yet police generally may have grown to accept Miranda, as various observers re-
port. See Tamar Jacoby, Why Cops Like Miranda. Newsweek 53 (July 18, 1988). After all, 
the consensus is that Miranda has had little appreciable effect on the rate of confessions. Nor 
has it curbed police use of lies, false sympathy, and similar tricky interrogation tactics-such 
as those Uviller himself suggests to a dubious 9 RIP officer. The evolution and effect of the 
Miranda doctrine are succinctly reviewed in Patrick A. Malone, "You Have the Right to 
Remain Silent':· Miranda After Twenty Years, 55 Am. Scholar 367 (1986). 
564 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 8:560 
rules that judges themselves fought over-and had only questiona-
ble authority to impose, anyway-while law professors "pretend[ed] 
this stuff makes sense. "11 And their legal knowledge had glaring 
gaps, like their belief in a "crime scene" exception to the search 
warrant requirement despite its explicit rejection by the Supreme 
Court a decade earlier, and their distinction-wholly spurious 
under existing law-between a true arrest and merely "picking 
someone up" for a stationhouse lineup. The officers' attitudes make 
all too predictable their frequent resort to perjury to make their ac-
tions retroactively "fit" constitutional rules. 
One of Uviller's most interesting claims is that the police suffer 
a malady law professors routinely observe in students-a tendency 
to seek and even invent hard-and-fast rules in place of the often 
amorphous standards pervading the law. This craving for certainty 
leads police to ascribe mistaken significance to rigid rules that they 
develop, such as precise verbal formulae for questioning lineup wit-
nesses or giving Miranda warnings, or the "two-hour/two-mile" 
rule conjured up to govern the permissibility of show-ups. It could 
also account for another phenomenon Uviller observes (without 
drawing the connection): an occasional tendency for police to 
"overestimate restrictions on their authority." Uviller's example is 
the 9 RIP officers' refusal to arrest a robbery suspect without a con-
fident lineup identification, which seems like another instance of po-
lice treating a policy of their own devising as if it were a rigid legal 
requirement. 
Uviller actually claims that overestimating restrictions is the 
general police rule, not an occasional practice. His observations be-
lie this, however-witness the cops' mistaken beliefs in a crime-
scene exception to the warrant requirement, an ability to "pick 
someone up" for a lineup without probable cause, and the ease of 
establishing consent to an otherwise unauthorized search or seizure. 
Even these instances where police underestimate the restrictions on 
their authority bespeak a longing for "bright line" rules: crime 
scenes can always be searched; arrest always means full-scale cus-
tody, booking, and charging; consent needn't require detailed exam-
ination of all circumstances of the particular situation. It would be 
interesting to see how prevalent among police the quest for cer-
II. Other observen; find police less hostile to Warren-era constitutional restraints. A 
1986 survey of Chicago narcotics officen; concluded that they almost always unden;tood what 
they'd done wrong when evidence was suppressed, and favored retaining the exclusionary 
rule (though with a good faith exception) rather than abolishing it. Comment, The Exclu-
sionary Rule and Deterrence: An Empirical Study of Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 1016 (1987). 
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tainty Uviller observes really is, and how much police behavior it 
might explain. 
It would also be interesting to see more detailed empirical stud-
ies of the real-life constraints on the theoretical powers of the police. 
Uviller provides a striking example when he discusses how the stat-
utory availability of telephone search warrants, which greatly speed 
up the warrant process and encourage officers to use it, has been 
nullified in New York County by the turf-protective hostility of the 
District Attorney's office. This is precisely the kind of information 
most helpful to someone without firsthand law enforcement experi-
ence who reads appellate opinions on warrantless searches and won-
ders why the cops didn't just get a warrant-how long could it take, 
anyway? 
Although many of Uviller's observations, like those just dis-
cussed, are thought-provoking and suggestive, the book's episodic 
format and a desire to touch on a wide range of topics prevent Uvil-
ler from developing any of them too deeply. More disturbingly, the 
book is marred by a surprising number of legal errors and a perva-
sive reluctance to examine critically the perceptions and behavior of 
the police. 
For example, Uviller is wrong in treating the rule against co-
erced confessions as an outgrowth of the fifth amendment, in assert-
ing that states are free "to extend federal as well as state 
constitutional constructions," in declaring that "(a] request for 
counsel operates exactly like a refusal to be questioned at all" for 
Miranda purposes, and in defining "prejudice" as if it applied only 
to the erroneous admission of evidence. His penchant for a "cop's-
eye" view of the law leads him to ridicule judicial aversion to hyp-
notically refreshed testimony as "one of those strange areas of con-
servative suspicion one encounters from time to time in law" in 
which judges "shy away" from an otherwise well-regarded tool 
"(w]ithout logic or reason" by relying on "bits of this and that 
picked up from here and there." In fact, the leading cases excluding 
such testimony-People v. Shirley 12 in California and People v. 
Hughes 13 in New York-rely heavily on the writings of scientific 
experts in detailing, carefully and at length, the unreliability of hyp-
nosis. Elsewhere, too, Uviller seems too quick to accept the police 
at face value or to put the best possible gloss on their behavior-
even suggesting that police petjury isn't really so bad if it merely 
circumvents an exclusionary rule. He never seems to wonder why 
the officers he portrays as unfailingly polite and professional arouse 
12. 31 Cal. 3d 18, 723 P.2d 1354, 181 Ca. Rptr. 243 (1982). 
13. 59 N.Y.2d 523, 453 N.E.2d 484, 466 N.Y.S.2d 255 (1983). 
566 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 8:560 
such disbelief in "big-city jurors" and such fear in even the victims 
of crime. 
Despite its defects, Tempered Zeal is worth the attention of 
students of the criminal justice system. Its ultimate message, like 
Jerome Skolnick's a quarter-century ago, is that police are caught 
between conflicting demands, but Uviller and Skolnick disagree on 
what those demands are. For Uviller, the public demands both "ef-
fective anticrime activity and restraint," with cops "out in the 
streets as a visible deterrent force as well as a crime-solving and 
criminal-apprehension battalion, while at the same time ... law 
bound [and] rule observant." Skolnick, by contrast, found little evi-
dence that the citizenry wanted "restraint" at all, and instead de-
picted the police as caught in a "conflict between the democratic 
ideology of work and the legal philosophy of a democracy."t4 Both 
perspectives are illuminating, and still more light is needed. Per-
haps the greatest service Professor Uviller's book can perform 
would be to stimulate others to follow in his footsteps. 
COURTS, CORRECTIONS AND THE CONSTITUTION: 
THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL INTERVENTION ON 
PRISONS AND JAilS.• Edited by John J. Dilullo, Jr.2 
New York, N.Y.: The Oxford University Press. 1990. pp. 
xii, 338. $32.50. 
Elizabeth Alexander 3 
I doubt that any lawyer can practice in the field of prison law, 
whether on behalf of prisoners or on behalf of correctional officials, 
and not be a legal realist. Whatever the situation in less polarized 
14. Skolnick, Justice Without Trial at 235 (cited in note 5). 
I. This collection consists of the following essays: Malcolm M. Feeley and Roger A. 
Hanson, The Impact of Judicia/Intervention on Prisons and Jails: A Framework for Analysis 
and a Review of the Literature; John J. Dilulio, Jr., The Old Regime and the Ruiz Revolution; 
Sheldon Ekland-Olson and Steve J. Martin, Ruiz: A Struggle Over Legitimacy; Ben M. 
Crouch and James W. Marquart, Ruiz: Intervention and Emergent Order in Texas Prisons; 
Bradley S. Chilton and Susette M. Talarico, Politics and Constitutional Interpretation in 
Prison Reform Litigation: The Case of Guthrie v. Evans; Ted S. Storey, When Intervention 
Works; Edward E. Rhine, The Rule of Law. Disciplinary Practices, and Rahway State Prison; 
Bert Unseem, Crain: Nonreformist Prison Reform; Robert C. Bradley, Judicial Appointment 
and Judicia/Intervention; Clair A. Cripe, Courts. Corrections. and the Constitution: A Practi-
tioner's View; and John J. Dilulio, Jr., Conclusion: What Judges Can Do to Improve Prisons 
and Jails. 
2. Associate Professor of Politics and Public Affairs, Princeton University. 
3. Associate Director for Litigation, National Prison Project of the American Civil 
Liberties Union Foundation. 
